In Asia, a lot of successful economies that had been living on their own saving, decided to open up their financial markets to international capital in the early 1990s. So here were countries doing quite well, but they decided they'd borrow a bit more and do even better.

Profession: Economist

Topics: Successful, Financial, Countries, Living, Open,

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Meaning: The quote by Jeffrey Sachs, an American economist, touches upon the economic phenomenon that occurred in Asia during the early 1990s. It refers to the decision made by several successful economies in Asia to open up their financial markets to international capital, indicating a shift towards increased integration with the global financial system. This decision was driven by the desire to further boost economic growth and development, despite already performing well with their existing resources.

During the early 1990s, many Asian countries had achieved significant economic success through their own savings and domestic investment. This period marked a time of rapid industrialization and economic growth in the region, with countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, often referred to as the "Asian Tigers," experiencing remarkable economic expansion. These countries had managed to accumulate substantial savings and were running significant trade surpluses, leading to a strong financial position.

However, despite their economic success, these countries made the strategic decision to open up their financial markets to international capital. This move was driven by the belief that by borrowing more and integrating with international financial markets, they could potentially achieve even greater economic prosperity. The decision to open up to international capital was motivated by the prospect of accessing additional funds for investment, technology transfer, and further economic development.

The opening up of financial markets to international capital involved various measures such as deregulating financial systems, allowing foreign investment, and liberalizing capital flows. This shift towards greater financial openness was not without risks, as it exposed these economies to the volatility and uncertainties of global financial markets. However, the prevailing belief at the time was that the benefits of increased integration would outweigh the potential drawbacks.

The quote implies that the decision to open up to international capital was driven by the pursuit of even greater economic success. Jeffrey Sachs points out the willingness of these successful economies to borrow more and take advantage of international capital flows in order to further enhance their economic performance. This reflects a common phenomenon where countries, even when performing relatively well, seek to leverage external financial resources to fuel additional growth and development.

The consequences of this decision varied across different Asian economies. While some countries benefited from increased access to international capital and technology transfer, others faced challenges such as currency crises and financial instability. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, which originated in Thailand and subsequently spread to other economies in the region, highlighted the potential risks associated with rapid financial liberalization and excessive reliance on external capital.

In conclusion, the quote by Jeffrey Sachs captures a pivotal moment in the economic history of Asia during the early 1990s. It reflects the strategic decision made by successful economies in the region to open up their financial markets to international capital in pursuit of further economic advancement. This move, while driven by aspirations for continued growth and development, also underscored the complexities and potential pitfalls associated with increased financial integration. The subsequent experiences of these economies serve as valuable lessons in understanding the dynamics of financial openness and its implications for economic stability and resilience.

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