Meaning: This quote by Samuel Alexander, a philosopher and educator, reflects his critique of the philosopher John Locke's treatment of ideas of reflection. John Locke was an influential figure in the field of epistemology and is often considered the father of modern empiricism. In his work "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," Locke distinguished between two types of ideas: ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection.

Ideas of sensation, according to Locke, are derived from the external world through our senses. These ideas are the result of direct sensory experiences, such as seeing, hearing, touching, and tasting. On the other hand, ideas of reflection are derived from the mind's internal operations, such as thinking, reasoning, and introspection. Locke argued that these ideas are not derived from external sources but rather from the mind's own activities.

Samuel Alexander's critique of Locke's treatment of ideas of reflection suggests that he believed Locke mistakenly treated these ideas as a separate class of objects of contemplation, distinct from ideas of sensation. Alexander's critique highlights a fundamental philosophical disagreement regarding the nature of ideas and the relationship between the mind and the external world.

Locke's distinction between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection was significant in the development of empiricist philosophy. By emphasizing the role of sensory experience in shaping our understanding of the world, Locke challenged traditional philosophical views that placed greater emphasis on innate ideas or rationalism. Locke's empiricist approach had a profound impact on subsequent philosophical and scientific thought, influencing thinkers such as David Hume, George Berkeley, and Immanuel Kant.

However, Samuel Alexander's critique suggests that Locke's treatment of ideas of reflection may have been problematic. Alexander may have been concerned that Locke's separation of ideas of reflection from ideas of sensation created an artificial distinction that did not accurately reflect the complex interplay between sensory experience and mental reflection. By treating ideas of reflection as if they were a separate class of objects, Locke may have overlooked the intricate ways in which the mind processes and synthesizes both sensory and reflective experiences.

Alexander's critique may also signal a broader concern about the limitations of Locke's empiricist approach. While Locke's emphasis on sensory experience was groundbreaking, it may have led to an oversimplification of the mind's cognitive processes. By treating ideas of reflection as distinct from ideas of sensation, Locke may have neglected the intricate ways in which the mind actively engages with and interprets sensory data, leading to a more nuanced understanding of the nature of knowledge and perception.

In conclusion, Samuel Alexander's critique of John Locke's treatment of ideas of reflection raises important questions about the nature of ideas, the relationship between the mind and the external world, and the limitations of empiricist philosophy. By challenging Locke's distinction between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection, Alexander invites us to reconsider the complexities of human cognition and the ways in which our understanding of the world is shaped by both sensory experience and internal reflection. This critique serves as a reminder of the ongoing dialogue and debate within the field of epistemology and the continual refinement of our understanding of the nature of knowledge and perception.