Meaning:
Thomas Aquinas, a prominent theologian and philosopher of the medieval period, made a thought-provoking statement when he said, "Moral science is better occupied when treating of friendship than of justice." This quote reflects Aquinas's belief in the significance of friendship in the realm of moral inquiry and ethical considerations. To fully understand the implications of this statement, it is essential to delve into the context of Aquinas's philosophical framework and the concepts of friendship and justice as understood in his work.
In Aquinas's moral philosophy, the virtue of friendship holds a central place. He believed that friendship is not only a natural human inclination but also a moral virtue that contributes to the well-being of individuals and society as a whole. Unlike justice, which primarily deals with the external actions and rights of individuals, friendship encompasses a deeper and more intimate connection between individuals. Aquinas distinguished between different types of friendship, such as friendships of utility, pleasure, and virtue, and emphasized the importance of virtuous friendship based on mutual goodwill and moral goodness.
Aquinas's preference for treating of friendship over justice in moral science can be understood in light of his broader ethical framework, which prioritizes the cultivation of virtuous dispositions and the pursuit of human flourishing. While justice is undoubtedly a crucial aspect of moral life, Aquinas seems to suggest that the cultivation of virtuous friendships and the bonds of affection and goodwill between individuals are fundamental to the practice of morality and the realization of human excellence.
Moreover, Aquinas's emphasis on friendship aligns with his broader theological perspective, which is rooted in the Christian tradition. In Christian ethics, love and charity are central virtues, and the notion of friendship is often associated with the love of neighbor and the communal aspects of human life. Aquinas's moral philosophy is deeply influenced by his theological commitments, and his prioritization of friendship can be seen as a reflection of the Christian emphasis on love and relationality in ethical conduct.
In contemporary ethical discourse, Aquinas's insight into the significance of friendship in moral science continues to be relevant. In a world marked by increasing individualism and social fragmentation, the value of genuine and virtuous friendships is increasingly recognized as essential for human well-being and ethical living. Studies in psychology and sociology have underscored the importance of social connections and supportive relationships for mental health, emotional resilience, and overall life satisfaction.
Furthermore, the ethical implications of friendship extend beyond individual well-being to the broader social and political dimensions of human existence. The cultivation of friendships based on mutual respect, empathy, and moral concern can foster a sense of solidarity and cooperation within communities, leading to a more just and compassionate society. In this sense, Aquinas's assertion that moral science is better occupied when treating of friendship than of justice resonates with contemporary discussions on the role of empathy, compassion, and social cohesion in ethical and political discourse.
In conclusion, Thomas Aquinas's statement about the superiority of treating of friendship over justice in moral science reflects his profound understanding of the ethical significance of human relationships and the cultivation of virtuous dispositions. By prioritizing the moral virtue of friendship, Aquinas highlights the intimate and communal aspects of ethical life, emphasizing the importance of genuine connections, goodwill, and mutual support in the pursuit of human excellence and the common good. His insights continue to offer valuable perspectives for contemporary ethical inquiry and the ongoing quest for a more just and compassionate society.